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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is founded in Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(4), and
78-2a-3(2)(j), as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the Trial Court correctly hold that plaintiff Meadow Valley was entitled
to summary judgment and that defendant Transcontinental Insurance Company
owed a duty to provide insurance coverage, investigate claims, defend and
indemnify Meadow Valley for any and all claims made as a result of the damage
caused by the flooding identified in Meadow Valley's complaint?
Issues decided upon a motion for summary judgment raise questions of
law and are accorded no deference by the Appellate Court. See. Crossroads
Plaza Assoc, v. Pratt. 912 P.2d 961 (Utah 1996); Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County.
855P.2d231 (Utah 1993).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
On March 25,1999, Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. ("Meadow Valley")
brought this action against Transcontinental Insurance Company
('Transcontinental") for breach of Transcontinental's duty to defend, investigate,
and indemnify Meadow Valley for claims arising out of flood damage to third party
property owners which occurred on or about May 24,1997. (R.1-4). Meadow
Valley filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was heard by the Trial Court
on January 31, 2000. (R.224). After reviewing the undisputed facts and applying
the appropriate law, the Trial Court granted Meadow Valley's Motion for Summary
Judgment and ordered Transcontinental "to provide insurance coverage,
investigate, defend and indemnify Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. for any and all
claims made as a result of the damage caused by the flooding identified in
plaintiff's complaint." (R.217-218).

i

(
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of Meadow Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial
Court reviewed the following undisputed facts:
1.

On or about May 24,1997, Meadow Valley, Inc. was the general

contractor for the highway construction project from 1-15,1-215 to 2600 South in
Woods Cross. The owner of the project was the Utah Department of
Transportation. (R.54-55, 64,117-118).
2.

Meadow Valley and B.T. Gallegos Construction Company, Inc.

("Gallegos") entered into a subcontract agreement wherein Gallegos agreed to
build and/or install certain storm drainage structures and related items for the
project. (R.55, 64, 75-76,163).
3.

Prior to May 24,1997, Gallegos removed a manhole and small pipes

in preparation to install larger pipes and related structures to accommodate water
drainage. In addition, Gallegos had formed and poured concrete walls and slabs
for installation of a concrete outlet box for the project. (R.55,151).
4.

In order to construct the concrete outlet box, Gallegos diverted an

on-going stream of water into a previously existing drainage ditch. (R.52, 53,
164, 186, 88, 224 at 10-11).
5.

In order to facilitate the diversion of the water into the pre-existing

drainage ditch, Gallegos constructed a small channel to take the water flowing
into the storm drain system and direct it into the pre-existing ditch. (R.152-153,
164,186, 188, 224 at 11).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

On or about May 24,1997, it began to rain heavily at the

construction site. (R.55,118,152).
7.

As a result of the heavy rain, water normally handled by the storm

drain system, which Gallegos channeled around the work site into the existing
ditch, flooded the entire area and near-by businesses. (R. 154).
8.

Gallegos' employee, Mr. Maughan, made attempts to remove forms

from the outlet box so water could flow through the box and back into the storm
drain system. (R.56,154).
9.

Meadow Valley employee, Mr. Jessop, attempted to stabilize the

ditch to avoid further flood damage. (R.56,154).
10.

Mr. Maughan and Mr. Jessop worked together to obtain a large track

hoe to stabilize the ditch. Thereafter, Mr. Maughan and Mr. Jessop agreed to

(

remove an existing metal pipe to allow the water to flow back into the outlet box
and the storm drain system. (R. 119,154,165,186-187).
11.

Pursuant to the subcontract agreement, Gallegos was required to

purchase a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy with an
endorsement naming Meadow Valley as an additional insured. (R.71).
12.

Gallegos purchased a CGL policy which named Meadow Valley as

an additional insured pursuant to a blanket additional insured endorsement.
(R.138-139).
13.

.

;

The insurance policy issued by Transcontinental naming Meadow

Valley as an additional insured provides coverage to Meadow Valley as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

1. That person or organization is only an
additional insured with respect to liability arising out of:
a. premises you own, rent, lease, or occupy;
or
b. "y° ur work" for that additional insured by or
for you.
2. The limits of insurance applicable to the
additional insured are those specified in the written
contractor agreement or in the declarations for this
policy, whichever is less. These limits of insurance are
inclusive and not in addition to the limits of insurance
shown on the declarations.
(R.138).
14.

The insurance policy defines "your work" as follows:
a. work or operations performed by you or on
your behalf; and
b. materials, parts, or equipment furnished in
connection with such work or operations.
"Your work" includes:
a. Warranties or representations made at any
time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability,
performance or use of "your work"; and
b. the providing of or failure to provide
warnings or instructions.

(R.137).
15.

As a result of the flooding, several businesses have made claims

against Meadow Valley, totaling $420,472.90. (R.142).
16.

Meadow Valley has made several tenders of defense to

Transcontinental requesting it to honor its duty to defend and indemnify Meadow
Valley pursuant to the insurance contract issued by Transcontinental wherein
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Meadow Valley was named as an additional insured. Transcontinental has
refused these tenders of defense. (R.142).
17.

As a result of Transcontinental's rejection of the tenders of defense,

Meadow Valley filed an action against Gallegos for breach of its subcontract and
against Transcontinental for breach of its duties under the insurance contract.
(R.1-4).
18.

On May 14,1999, Transcontinental filed a Motion to Sever the

claims Meadow Valley made pursuant to the insurance coverage against
Transcontinental from the claims Meadow Valley made against Gallegos
i

pursuant to the subcontract. The Motion to Sever was granted. (R.23, 52).
19.

In its Motion to Sever, Transcontinental stated, "The question of

whether B.T. Gallegos was negligent in the performance of its subcontract work

'

is completely separate from the question of whether the plaintiff was covered as
an additional insured under the insurance agreement with Transcontinental."
(R.26). (Emphasis added).
20.

Transcontinental also asserts that, "In the case at hand, there is no

logical relationship between the negligence claim against B.T. Gallegos and the
contract claim against Transcontinental,..." (R.29).
21.

On December 1,1999, Meadow Valley filed a partial motion for

<

summary judgment against Transcontinental requesting the Court order
Transcontinental to honor its duties to indemnify and defend Meadow Valley
i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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under the insurance contract to which Meadow Valley was named as an
additional insured. (R146-147).
22.

Meadow Valley's motion for partial summary judgment was granted.

(R.216-218).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary judgment was properly granted in the present circumstances as
the undisputed facts clearly indicate that the flooding in question arose from the
construction of the drainage system pursuant to the Gallegos subcontract. The
insurance contract to which Meadow Valley was named as an additional insured
provides coverage to Meadow Valley because the flooding "arose out o f
Gallegos' work. Whether Meadow Valley is covered under the Transcontinental
policy does not require a determination of negligence or an assessment of fault.
Rather, the overwhelming majority of cases dealing with the issue have held that
when determining coverage under an insurance policy, the term "arising out of is
considered synonymous with "originating" or "come into being" as opposed to
"proximate cause". Thus, the issues of fact asserted by Transcontinental are not
genuine or material to the determination of coverage in this case, and the court
appropriately applied the law to the relevant facts.
Finally, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1 are inapplicable to the
insurance policy in question. Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1 applies to indemnification
provisions contained in construction contracts, not contracts for insurance such
as that issued by Transcontinental.
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In accordance with the foregoing, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's
grant of summary judgment.

,
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

There are no Genuine Issues of Material Fact.

<

-

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of
i

material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c). The fact that a party disputes facts "does not
preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but

{

only when a material fact is genuinely controverted." Heqlar Ranch. Inc.. v.
Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390,1391 (Utah 1980); see also. Atkinson v. IHC Hospitals.
798 P.2d 733 at n.17 (Utah 1990) ("the rule on summary judgment may apply
even when some fact remains in dispute; we affirm summary judgment when all
material facts are not genuinely controverted.")
As will be shown below, the issues of fault, negligence and proximate
causation are not relevant with respect to a determination of insurance coverage

<

in this case. Those are issues which are, instead, relevant in relation to the
litigation between Meadow Valley and Gallegos which was previously severed by
i
the Trial Court on motion of Transcontinental.
Transcontinental has admitted all facts necessary for the Trial Court to
make the legal determination in favor of coverage in this case. Transcontinental

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

admitted that Gallegos contracted to construct a concrete outlet drainage box
pursuant to the subcontract. Transcontinental admitted that Gallegos diverted an
existing stream of water around the concrete box and channeled the water into
existing ditches. Transcontinental admits that the water which flooded the
businesses in question originated from an existing stream of water which
Gallegos channeled into the existing ditches. Finally, Transcontinental admits that
a Gallegos employee (Mr. Maughan) worked with a Meadow Valley employee
(Mr. Jessop) before and during the flooding incident. These employees were
engaged in work specifically related to the construction work being performed
pursuant to the Gallegos construction subcontract. These facts, and these facts
alone, are sufficient for this Court to affirm the Trial Court's grant of summary
judgment.
B.

The Flood "Arose out of Gallegos' Work.

Based upon well-settled precedent, Transcontinental's appeal fails for the
same reason as its opposition failed below. The only question presented on
appeal (despite Transcontinental's claim that there are facts in dispute) is a
purely legal determination of the interpretation of an insurance contract. It is clear
that the interpretation of contractual language contained within an insurance
policy "is a question of law that may be resolved by the court in the context of a
motion for summary judgment." Cypress Plateau Mining Corporation v.
Commonwealth Ins. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1379,1382 (D. Utah 1997). See also.
West American Ins. Co. v. V&S, 145 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1998).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Transcontinental policy provides coverage for "an additional insured
[Meadow Valley] with respect to liability arising out of: b. "your work" [Gallegos]

(

for that additional insured [Meadow Valley] by or for you." (R.138). The policy
defines "your work" as follows:
a. work or operations performed by you or on
your behalf; and
b. materials, parts, or equipment furnished in
connection with such work or operations.
(R.137).
Transcontinental's primary argument on appeal is the assertion that the
flooding in this case was caused solely by the negligent actions of Meadow

<

Valley's employee, Richard Jessop, and, therefore, did not "arise out of"
Gallegos' work. Contrary to Transcontinental's assertions, the majority of courts
have held that the term "arising out of" is not synonymous with the idea of
causation or negligence. As such, whether or not Meadow Valley was negligent
in part or in whole is not determinative, and does not relieve Transcontinental of

<

its contractual duties to Meadow Valley under the insurance contract.
In Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Svufv Enterprises. 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 557 (Cal.App.
1st 1999), the court noted that the insurance policy to which the additional insured
was named included the term "arising out of rather than specifically limiting
coverage for the additional insured to situations where the additional insured
faced vicarious liability for negligence on the part of the named insured. In an
effort to define "arising out of", the Svufv court stated:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

California courts have consistently given a broad
interpretation to the terms "arising out of or "arising
from" in various kinds of insurance provisions. It is
settled that this language does not import any particular
standard of causation or theory of liability into an
insurance policy. Rather, it broadly links a factual
situation with the event creating liability and connotes
only a minimal causal connection or incidental
relationship. ]d. at 562.
In finding coverage for the additional insured, the Svufv court held:
Insurance companies are free to, and commonly have,
issued additional insured endorsements that specifically
limit coverage to situations in which the additional
insured is faced with vicarious liability for negligent
conduct by the named insured... when an insurer
chooses not to use such clearly limited language in an
additional insured clause, but instead grants coverage
for liability 'arising out of the named insured's work, the
additional insured is covered without regard to whether
the injury was caused by the named insured or the
additional insured.
jd. at 562-63. See also. Container Corp. of America v. Maryland Cas. Co.. 707
So.2d 733, 736 (Fla. 1998) (if the insurance company wished to limit coverage to
vicarious liability for negligence, it would have done so by clear policy language);
Merchant's Ins. Co. of New Hampshire v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty.
143 F.3d 5,10 (1st Cir. 1998) (if insurance company intends to limit coverage to
vicarious liability of a named insured, it is free to draft a policy that expressly
implements that intention); Casualty Ins. Co. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty
Ins. Co.. 501 N.E.2d 812, 814-815 (III. App. Ct. 1986) (coverage does not depend
on the fault of a named insured).
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In Mclntosch v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.. 992 F.2d 251 (10,n Cir. 1993), Wichita
Festivals, Inc. ("Festivals") contracted to operate the 1988 Wichita River Festival

,

for the City of Wichita ("Wichita"). Pursuant to the contract, Festivals purchased
liability insurance from Scottsdale naming Wichita as an additional insured. The
additional insured endorsement provided coverage "with respect to liability arising
out of operations performed for such insured by or on behalf of the named
insured." ]d. at 254. During the Festival, Mclntosch was injured as a result of

i

Wichita's sole negligence. Wichita stipulated that it was 100% at fault and a
judgment was awarded to Mclntosch. Scottsdale denied coverage to Wichita on
the theory that coverage was limited to situations where there was vicarious
liability for the named insured's negligence. The Mclntosch court held that the
additional insured endorsement does not limit coverage to cases where the

(

additional insured is held vicariously liable for a named insured's negligence, jd.
at 254. The Court further held that Wichita was covered under the additional
insured endorsement even though Wichita admitted liability, jd. at 255.
In Merchants Ins. Co. of New Hampshire. Inc. v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co.. 143 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 1998), a subcontractor purchased an insurance
policy through USF&G and listed the general contractor as an additional insured.
The insurance policy contained language strikingly similar to, if not exactly the

<

same as, the language contained in the policy issued by Transcontinental in the
present case. During the course of the construction project, one of the
<

subcontractor's employees was injured due to negligent actions of the general
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contractor. The injured employee sued the general contractor, who then
tendered the defense to USF&G. USF&G rejected the tender of defense under
the theory that the additional insured endorsement did not afford coverage to the
general contractor for the general contractor's own negligence. id. at 7. The
general contractor then settled with the injured employee through the general ,-•
contractor's insurance carrier, Merchant's Insurance Company. Merchant's
Insurance Company then sued USF&G in a subrogation cause of action. ]d.
In holding that USF&G's policy provided coverage to the general contractor
for the general contractor's own negligence, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
held:
The usual meaning ascribed to the phrase "arising out
of" is much broader than "caused by"; the former phrase
is considered synonymous with "originate" or come into
being".... the expression "arising out of indicates a
wider range of causation than the concept of proximate
causation and tort law.
jd. at 9 (citations omitted).
In some cases, the use of the term "arising out of" has been interpreted in
favor of the insurance company. However, these cases use the same definition
of the term as the majority view discussed above. In Toll Bridge Authority v.
Aetna Ins. Co.. 773 P.2d 906 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), the Toll Bridge Authority
('TBA") purchased insurance for its operation of a ferry system. A passenger of
the ferry was injured while disembarking from the ferry to the dock. The
passenger sued TBA alleging negligence. TBA sought coverage from Aetna for
indemnity. At issue was a policy exclusion for incidents "arising out of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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operations, maintenance, or use of any water craft...." id. at 908. The Trial
Court granted Aetna's motion for summary judgment upholding the exclusion.

<

In affirming the Trial Court's ruling, the appellate court held that "[t]he
phrase 'arising out of is unambiguous and has a broader meaning than 'caused
by'or'resulted from'. It is ordinarily understood to mean'originating from',
'having its origin in', 'growing out of, or 'flowing from'." id. at 908. Based on this
definition, the court rejected TBA's claim that there were issues of fact as to

(

proximate cause and negligence which would preclude summary judgment. jd.
It is clear that whether Meadow Valley or Gallegos were negligent in whole
or in part has no effect in the determination of coverage in this case. The issue
before the court is whether the flooding in this case "arose out of, "originated",
"came into being", "grew out o f or "flowed from" work or operations being

(

performed by Gallegos or on Gallegos' behalf pursuant to the subcontract. Given
the undisputed facts considered by the Trial Court, it is clear that the water which
eventually flooded the businesses in question originated and "flowed from" work
and operations which had been performed by or for Gallegos, pursuant to the
<

subcontract. There is no question that the water originated from the existing
stream of water for which the concrete outlet box was being constructed. (R.153,
154,164,186, and 188). In fact, Gallegos constructed a channel to divert this

<

stream of water out of the storm drain into the existing ditch. (R.224 at 11).
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's order granting Meadow
i
Valley's motion for summary judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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C.
The Cases Cited by Transcontinental Have Been Distinguished
and/or Overruled.
Transcontinental relies on two Texas cases for the proposition that the
flooding in this case did not "arise out of Gallegos' work or work performed on
Gallegos' behalf. These cases have been distinguished/overruled by subsequent
Texas cases.
In Granite Const. Co. v. Bituminous Ins. Co.. 832 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.
1992), a trucking company (Brown) subcontracted with Granite to haul asphalt
from a site owned by Granite. The subcontract provided that '"[a]ll material shall
be F.O.B. [Brown's] truck at the source,' and that '[l]oading will be done at no cost
to [Brown]'." Id. at 428. After being loaded by Granite, a Brown truck driver was
injured when the truck he was driving overturned. Id. The truck driver sued
Granite for negligently loading the truck. ]d. Granite tendered the defense of the
lawsuit to Bituminous, Brown's insurer, based upon Granite's status as an
additional insured. Id. Bituminous refused the tender of defense and Granite
filed an action for declaratory relief, id. at 428-429. The Trial Court granted
Bituminous' motion for summary judgment and ruled that the Bituminous policy
did not provide coverage for Granite. ]d.
The Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's ruling in favor of Bituminous
by interpreting the policy language as providing insurance coverage for Granite
only for "operations performed for Granite by or on behalf of Brown." id. at 430.
Looking beyond the insurance policy, the Granite court held that Granite was
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being sued for negligent loading of the Brown truck, operations which were
expressly the duty of Granite under the contract between Granite and Brown.
Thus, the court interpreted the policy as unambiguously excluding coverage. ]d.
In 1994, two years after the Granite decision, the United States District
Court for the District of Texas followed the Granite decision as representative of
Texas law. See, Northern Insurance Co. of New York v. Austin Commercial Inc..
908 F.Supp. 436 (D. Tex. N.D. 1994). The Northern Insurance Company of New
York court held that additional insureds are covered "only for claims involving
direct negligence on the part of the named insured." |d. at 437.
i

Transcontinental's reliance on the Granite and Northern Insurance
Company of New York cases is wholly without merit as subsequent Texas cases
have accepted the majority view relating to interpretation of the term "arising out

'

of." Texas law began to change in 1999 when the Texas Court of Appeals dealt
with an additional insurance endorsement contained in a commercial general
liability policy which provided coverage to the additional insured for "liability
arising out of the named insured's operations." Admiral Insurance Co. v. Trident
Nal Inc.. 988 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. App. 1999) (emphasis added). In Admiral, a
subcontractor (K.D.) entered into a service agreement with Trident to service an
oil and gas facility owned by Trident. Id. at 452. Pursuant to the employment
contract, Trident was named as an additional insured to a CGL policy issued to
K.D. by Admiral, id. While in the process of unloading Trident's tools from a
Trident truck, a K.D. employee was seriously injured when a compressor
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exploded, jd. at 453. Neither the K.D. employee "nor anyone employed by K.D.
performed any act or failed to perfc m any act that caused the compressor to
explode." ]d. The K.D. employee sued Trident for tort damages. Trident
tendered the defense of the case to Admiral as an additional insured under the
K.D. policy. Admiral rejected the tender of defense.
Admiral's argument for rejecting Trident's tender of defense was that
"absent an affirmative act by K.D. that caused or contributed to the explosion, the
additional insured endorsement in the policy . . . did not provide coverage." jd. at
454. The Texas Appellate Court rejected Admiral's argument as well as the
holdings in the Granite and Northern Insurance Companv of New York cases, jd
at fn.4. The Admiral court adopted 'the rule followed by the majority of courts
around the country." jd. at 455. The Court specifically cited to and followed the
holdings of Merchant's v. USF&G and Mclntosch v. Scottsdale previously
discussed in this brief. In so doing, the Admiral court stated:
[f]or liability to "arise out of operations" of a named
insured it is not necessary for the named insured's acts
to have "caused" the accident; rather, it is sufficient that
the named insured's employee was injured while
present at the scene in connection with performing the
named insured's business, even if the cause of the
injury was the negligence of the additional insured.
id. at 454 (emphasis added).
Subsequent to the Admiral decision, the Texas Court of Appeals revisited
the issue of the construction/interpretation of additional-insured endorsements. In
McCarthy Bros. Co. v. Continental Lloyd's Ins. Co.. 7 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.
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1999), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that Texas followed the majority view in
the interpretation of the phrase "arising out of." Id. at 729. McCarthy was a
general contractor who hired Crouch Electric to provide electrical services for a
construction project, id. at 727. McCarthy was named as an additional insured to
the CGL policy issued to Crouch Electric by Continental Lloyd's insurance
Company (Continental). An employee of Crouch Electric was injured when he
slipped and fell at the construction site. id. The Crouch Electric employee sued
McCarthy who then tendered the defense to Continental pursuant to McCarthy's
status as an additional insured. Continental rejected the tender of defense
because the allegations in the suit by the Crouch Electric employee alleged
"negligence" only on the part of McCarthy, not on the part of Crouch, and thus the
liability . . . did not arise out of Crouch's work for McCarthy." id.
The McCarthy court specifically followed the holding of the Admiral Court
and rejected the previous holding in Granite. The McCarthy court made
reference to the definition of "arising out of" used in the Merchant's Insurance Co.
v. USF&G case by stating, '"arising out of is broader than the concept of
proximate causation and tort law...." lid. at 730. In support of its acceptance of
the majority view, the court also made reference to the definition of "arising out of"
found in the Mclntosch v. Scottsdale case, id. atfn.7.
In finding that McCarthy was covered as an additional insured under the
policy issued to Crouch Electric by Continental, the Texas Court of Appeals held:
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The Insurance companies offer a competing
interpretation for the phrase "arising out of that they
claim is equally reasonable and thus creates an
ambiguity. Their interpretation would limit the
interpretation of "arising out o f to mean coming directly
from; i.e., for liability to arise out of Crouch's work for
McCarthy, the liability must stem directly from Crouch's
negligence and cannot extend to negligence caused
solely by McCarthy. Post-Lindsay, however, such a
restrictive interpretation no longer appears reasonable in
Texas and cannot be used to create ambiguity.
However, were we to consider the phrase "arising out
of" ambiguous, we would apply the familiar rules that
construe the policy against the insurer and reach the
same result.
Id. at 730-731 (emphasis added).
It is clear that the majority of cases and jurisdictions who have dealt with
the interpretation of additional insured endorsements and the meaning of "arising
out o f support the Trial Court's finding that Meadow Valley is entitled to a
defense and indemnification for damages caused by the flooding on May 24,

1997.
II.

UTAH CODE ANN. §13-8-1 APPLIES ONLY TO CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS NOT LIABILITY INSURANCE CONTRACTS.
Transcontinental attempts to apply Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1(2) in an effort

to show that the insurance policy to which Meadow Valley is named as an
additional insured cannot provide coverage for Meadow Valley's "negligenf
actions. The statute states, "Except as provided in subsection (3), an
indemnification provision in a construction contract is against public policy and is
void and unenforceable." Transcontinental's theory is unwarranted as the statute
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specifically applies only to indemnification provisions in construction contracts.
By its terms, the statute does not apply to contractual obligations to provide or
carry insurance. Further, the statute does not apply to the interpretation of
insurance contracts. Finally, neither of the cases cited by Transcontinental
address a subcontractor's contractual obligation to procure and maintain
insurance for a general contractor or the interpretation of an insurance contract.
As such they are easily distinguished.

Transcontinental's theory has been addressed in other jurisdictions. A
case which is directly on point is Shell Oil Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of
PA, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. App. 2nd 1996). In Shell Oil, as in the present
case, the construction contract in question contained an indemnity clause. The
court found the indemnity clause to comply with the state statute which prohibited
indemnification for the sole negligence of the indemnitee. The indemnity clause
clearly stated that claims for injuries caused by Shell Oil's sole negligence were
excluded and was, therefore, enforceable. The indemnity clause in the present
case is similar to that contained in Shell Oil and complies with Utah law.1 As in
the present case, the subcontract in Shell Oil contained a separate clause
wherein the subcontractor was required to obtain liability insurance and name
Shell Oil as an additional insured. Id. at 582. See also. R.71.

1

See, R.72, "the subcontractor's obligation under this provision shall not extend
to any liability caused by the sole negligence of the indemnitee."
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In Shell Oil, the insurance company, National, argued that a requirement
within a construction contract to procure liability insurance was against public
policy and barred by a state statute which invalidated construction contract
indemnity agreements for an indemnitees' own negligence. The Shell Oil court
held, "this doctrine in terms does not apply here because the obligation to be
construed is not an indemnity clause . . . but rather an agreement to provide and
carry insurance. Insurance, of course, is commonly provided to protect from
liability for solitary negligence." Jd. at 585 (emphasis added).
Transcontinental's theory that Utah law and public policy prohibit coverage
for Meadow Valley under the insurance policy as an additional insured is a "red
herring." By its terms, Utah Code Ann. §13-8-1(2) is applicable only to
indemnification clauses contained within a construction contract. The
indemnification clause within the Gallegos subcontract is not relevant to the
interpretation of Gallegos' duties to procure and maintain insurance. Further,
neither the indemnification clause within the subcontract nor Utah Code Ann. §
13-8-1(2) are relevant for the purpose of interpreting the contract of insurance
issued by Transcontinental. Accordingly, this Court should hold that Gallegos'
duties to procure and maintain insurance under the subcontract do not
contravene public policy. This Court should further hold that the insurance policy
issued by Transcontinental provides coverage to Meadow Valley for the flooding
which is at issue in this case.
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CONCLUSION
This appeal involves the interpretation of the insurance contract issued by
Transcontinental to which Meadow Valley was named as an additional insured. It
does not involve a determination of negligence or proximate cause.
Transcontinental recognized this distinction early in the case when its request to
sever the two issues was granted.
The evidence is clear that the flooding in question arose from work being
performed pursuant to the Gallegos' subcontract. Further, it is clear that Utah
Code Ann. § 13-8-1(2) does not apply to a requirement in a construction contract
to procure and maintain insurance or the interpretation of an insurance contract.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the Trial Court's grant of
summary judgment.

IV

Respectfully submitted this '

day of November, 2000.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Jay E. Jensen
Scott T. Evans
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Meadow
Valley Contractors, Inc.
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